Abstract
Introduction
In the past few years, more and more attention has been drawn to the security of mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [12, 171. Due to its glorious success in securing Internet computing, the Intemet de facto standard public key cryptography including encryption and digital signature becomes the natural choice as a fundamental building block to secure MANET. However, since MANET is significantly different from the Internet, a salient issue is how to adapt the technology to the new environment.
As we know, successful application of public key c'yptography relies on the ubiquitous capability of verifying the binding between a public key and the owner principal. In the Internet, the mainstream solution is to have a third-party * n i s work has been supponed in pan by the NSF ITR grant ANI-0121416 centrally trusted entity, called Certificate Authority (CA), vouch for the authenticity of the binding by issuing digital certificates, which in essence is a statement of the binding digitally signed by the CA. In practice, CAS and digital certificates are organized and maintained by Public Key Infrast r u c t u~ (PIU) [S. 11.
It is questionable yet if PKI can be implemented in MANET because PIU requires well-protected CAS and constant connectivity between users and CAS. However, MANET is composed of a group of mobile devices communicating with each other through wireless link without a backbone or infrastructure. In such an environment, all devices are exposed to hacking to the same extent and no one can be assumed to be significantly more secure than the others. Moreover, devices roam around, run out of power orjust stop functioning, which lead to volatile connectivity among them and CAS. Research proposals have been seen in [20, 19, 131 etc to address the two issues by distributing the CA's functionality across a set of network nodes and use threshold signature [IS] to achieve tolerance up to the threshold number of faulty nodes. These methods are suitable for small MANET with a single CA. This is partially due to the inherent high communication cost. A more fundamental reason is that it is difficult if not infeasible for a CA to get familiar with all the other principals in large MANET while the trustworthiness of certificates a CA signs mainly depends on how much it knows about the principals.
Some researchers take another approach based on the concept of "web of trust" first appearing in PGP [22] . In thesemethodseachprincipalisitsownCA [l0,61 andkeeps a certificate directory. To authenticatea certificate signed by another principal, a principal has to find a certificate path between them. Although these methods avoid the problem of maintaining a key infrastructure at high cost they are faced with difficulty of finding such a path without incurring a lot ofbroadcastingcostsorforcingeachprincipal to save a large number of certificates in its local directory.
We believe to solve the key management issue in MANET we first must have a different view of it. Opposite to the traditional routing driven view of MANET as a monolithic network, we envision it from application angle 0-7803-8815-1/04/$20.00 0 2 0 0 4 IEEE as a group of interacting networks. This is based on our observation that MANET is more task or application oriented in that a MANET is usually formed to fulfill a task. Different MANETs may need to talk to each other to get help for another task. For instance, in a highway, a few cars going to a common destination establish a MANET to share directions and they may talk to other cars (in other MANET) to get information about traffic situation 1111. The application view discloses the locality of MANET. And we argue locality helps build key management hecause each MANET now are composed of principals for the same task, which should have close interaction with and distance between each other, and this further makes it possible for trust to he established dynamically.
We propose a new key management architecture driven by the application orientedview of MANET and the concept of locality of trust. In the architecture, certificate authorities are established only within a neighborhood using threshold cryptography and different certificate authorities maintain trust relationships, called trust chains for cross-CA authentication, Compared to the previous methods, our architecture shows a number of advantages which make it suitable for MANET. First and foremost, locality makes certificates more trustworthyin that in a local community a C A has better chance to interact with other principals. Moreover, the communication overhead between principals with their C A is reduced because of shorter local distance of message delivery. Thirdly, as with the other key management systems using threshold cryptography, the architecture inherits faulttolerance and high availability directly. Finally, it provides support for authenticating foreign certificates in a low-cost and timely fashion by lettingeach CA maintain a global trust table to maintain trust chains among CAS without forcing each individual principal to keep a huge certificate directory like in other PGP-like approaches [221. Compared to other systems like [IO] , the solution provides an answer with full certainty (not just a probability one) hut at lower communication cost by eliminating the need of broadcasting trust changes to even irrelevant principals every time. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect 2 discusses the related works. The architecture is introducedconceptually in Sect 3 followed by detailed descriptions in Sect 4. Then the correctness and costs of the our solution are evaluated in Sect 5 . Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect I . [20] is one of the first efforts addressing the key management issue in MANET. The authors proposed a conceptual model of distributed public key infrastructure, where a group of servers collectively act as a certificate authority.
Related Works
To achieve this, the service private(signing) key is broken into pieces, each of which is kept by one server, and threshold cryptography [18] is used to ensure that certificate services will not be subverted unless over a quorum of servers are not available and incorrect. The solution improves both availability and security of the certificate authority in that the system can continue to function as long as at least threshold number of servers are still available and functional. On the other hand, when the network consists of a large number of nodes, it may incur significant communication and computation overheads since every request needs to he distributed to and handled hy all participating servers. The idea was followed up and implemented in COCA [21] whereas the implementation is targeted for infrastructure-based networks such as the Internet.
MOCA [19]followsthesamedirectionbybuildingadis-
tributed certificate service with the help of threshold cryptography. It improves security by discriminatively picking more secure nodes as C A candidates and reduces communication overhead by caching routes to MOCAs and using unicast instead of flooding when sufficient cached routes exist. As with COCA, MOCA inherits high communication costs from threshold cryptography. Caching alleviates the problem to some extent when the network stays static such that the cached routes are valid for a relatively long period. However, in more volatile MANETs topology of which is changing rapidly, this optimization will be insufficient.
[I31 takes a step further by letting every node hold a share of the certificate authority secret key and any K nodes he able to recover the key. The security depends on the system-wide parameter K . Since now each node is a certificate server and compromising any K of them will disclose theprivatesigningkey, it actually endangers security to have a small K relative to the total number of nodes. However if K is too big, it degrades to the basic form of threshold C A as [20] .
Pathak et al proposed in [15] a voting based scheme for both public key authentication and group membership control. In this method, the decision of trust is made collectively by a group of n principals via voting. The system achieves high fault tolerance when it satisfies Byzantine condition. Compared to the above threshold based CA solutions, the method does not require a shared trusted principal (the dealer) and therefore does not have any single point of failure. However, the group does not own a single signing key. Consequently each individual principal has to know all the public keys of the ri voters and perform n signature verifications to authenticate one public key.
Another direction to the key management in MANET is to extend the "web of trust" concept of PGP [22] . The basic idea is to make each node be its own certificate authority.
[IO] is one of them. As a self-organized key management system, it eliminates the need to have central certificate directories in PGP for certificate distribution. Instead, each node picks and maintains a set of certificates according to some special selection algorithms. To authenticate a public key, the node U merges its own directory with the directoly of the key owner v and tries to find a path from u to v.
The selection algorithms guarantee high prohabilityof finding such a path with relatively small-sized local directory.
[6] proposed a group based method, where nodes are organized into groups identified by the group public key. Each group has a leader who owns the group private key and is responsible for certifying memberships by creating certificates to member nodes. Key authentication is at group level in a way similar to other PGP-like protocols but not faulttolerant in that a single compromised team leader can subvert the membership authentication. Since the method is targeted for scalable authorization, it does not support individual node authentication.
[5] and [7] solve the issue in certain special cases. In [5] , a strong key can be derived from some prior context, a shared weak secret among all nodes. In [7] , a secure side channel is assumed to exist to help initial key exchange hetween two nodes.
Our approach is inspired and influenced by the works above. What distinguishes it from them is our unique application driven view of MANETs, which makes it possible to construct a large scaled MANET from smaller local ones. Compared toworksin [21] , [19] and [13] whichalso use threshold signature to generate certificates, our approach ties a CA only to the local community it resides in. Consequently, the CA has better chance to interact with other principals within the same community and tell the authenticity of their public keys. To deal with cross CA authentication we build trust chains among communities, which shares the same idea as [22] , [6] and [lo] . However, in our approach only CA servers need to get involved to build the chains, which greatly reduces the size of certificate directory. Furthermore, trust chains are established using the same threshold method as in local CAS and thereby is not only much more difficult to subvert but able to provide accurate answers to certificate verification requests.
Key Management Architecture
Our key management architecture is driven by the application oriented view ofMANET and the concept of locality of trust. Actually the concept of locality has already been exploited explicitly or implicitly to help build security. For instance in [7] two network nodes set up a secure channel via location-limitedchannels. [I11 also enhances the trustworthiness of a certificate using locality in that a certificate is generated by one-hop neighbors in most cases. We adopt a different approach. Our architecture is composed of a group ofcertificate authorities(CAs), each ofwhich providespuhlic key authentication service to its own community. Among Figure 1 . We will explain in details how CAS and the trust relationships among them are established and maintained at conceptual level in this section and discuss the protocols in details in the next section.
Certificate Authority
Adjacent nodes jointly establish and maintain a certificate authority for key authentication. We say two nodes are adjacent if they have short routes to each other. We call these nodes CA servers to differentiate them from the other nodes in the neighborhood. Thc CA is constructed using standard threshold cryptography. To he self-contained we include the high level descriptionof the threshold mechanism. More information about threshold digital signature can be found in [ I & 141. unusual that such a dealer does exist, i.e. the chair of a workshop or the provider of some MANET services. Second, the trust is only needed at the bootstrap phase and can he revoked after CAS are fully setup. More importantly, bootstrap can also he accomplished without the help of the dealer as discussed in [14] . However to favor performance and simplicity it is not discussed here.
When N servers are chosen, the d generates the partial shares of SK: S K I , SK2 ... SKN for each server all signed with d's private key SKd with the threshold set to K. That is, any set of K servers can generate a valid CA signature by combining partial signature from each of them but any fewer than K servers can't. We require K > $ such that honest servers are the majority. Due to the locality nature of CA, the CA servers should have good connectivity to each other. We assume at any time at least K honest servers are available and for any message delivered at least K honest servers receive it. Then d distributes the partial shares to the other servers, destroys the CA private key SK and broadcasts the composition of the CA to the community.
2. CA Cenificore Generarion. The CA provides both certificate generation and verification services to the nodes in the community. Any node x in the community can request a certificate from the CA, which put in the simplestway, is thepuhlickeyofthenodedenotedas PK, signed with Sh' of the CA. The procedure starts with z submitting its P K , to one of the N servers, for inwhile a more prudent server may do more by checking if there are any conflicting requests for the same address. However, whatever policy CA servers choose, our architecture guarantees that no single or even up to K -1 malicious servers can subvert the authentication.
3. CA Cerrifcnre Revocnrion. Basically, the revocation process is similar to standard PIU with an exception that signature is generated in a threshold manner. The CA keeps a copy of all the revocations it has signed in its certificate revocation list (CRL). When a node y later wants to verify the validity of a certificate, it may send the request to the CA. Similar to processing certificate generation request, each CA server check its local CRL. If y is found in its CRL, it will partially sign a predefined denial message. Finally combining the partial signatures the CA can generate an signed reply in line with the decisions of at least K servers. When the CA revokes a certificate, it may optionally notify new revocations to the community. Since the community is local and the revocation is relatively rare, the communication cost is not prohibitive.
Trust Chain
So far, CAS manages key authentication for nodes in their local neighborhoods. When two nodes fromdifferent neighborhoods need to authcnticate each other, they need to have a trust chain. In this scction, we discuss the details of how a trust chain is established and maintained and how certificate can he authenticated using it. stance, s,. Since S, acts identity or its behavior. We assume trust is transitive while using CA's public key P K .
Our approach does not impose any restriction on how a CA server evaluates the trustworthiness of a principal's public key. Instead, the truStWOrthineSS of a puhlic key is fully determined by policies and rules, which can vary from CA to CA or even server to server within the same CA. CA servers are free to choose any policies at their own discretion. For instance, a CA server may he convinced of the authenticity of a node's public key just because the network address in the certificate request matches the source address of the request sender both distrust and unfamiliar are not. If A trusts B on its own, i.e. based on direct interactions with B, we call this direct trust, denoted as i to differentiate it from the trust gained by transitivity. Opposite to direct trust is indirect or recommendation trust. We say A indirectly trusts B if there exists a trust chain from principal Po to P,,, denoted as PO * P,,, defined recursively as follows:
(I) P,-i + P,, and (2) Po * P,-I Neither + nor =+. is symmetric, i.e A i B does not imply B + A. Formally, the trust chain can be represented as a directed graph G = ( y E ) where V is the set of vertices representing all CAS and E the set of edges representing the relations between two CAS. Based on the type of the relalion, we call it trust, distrust or unfamiliar edge. Let VI be a CA C1 and V, be another CA C,, the trust chain from Ci to C, can be represented as a directed path from Vi to Vz which is composed of only trust edges. If we take a CA as a mot, all the chains it has compose a trust tree. A CA verifies if the message comes from a directly trusted CA before taking further actions at each step by running public key authentication. The only exception is when a CA receives ESTABLISH message. This is because for one thing the receiver does not need to trust the sender (recall that trust is asymmetric) and for the other thing it may not have the sender's public key.
Cross CA Authentication
Trust chain provides a mechanism for cross CA authentication. When x wants to verify if PK., belongs to another node y. it verifies the validityof y's certificate. If y is signed by a CA x trusts, e.g. CA;, the key authentication is successful. However, if y just roams from another neighborhood and only has one certificate signed by C A j , x may still be able to authenticate y if there is a trust chain from CA; to CA,. When CA; finds an entry like ( j , I , w)w > 0 in its R;, it can either reply with a message of "successful authentication" or continue sending verification request to CL, which recursively repeats the same procedure until a response signed by Cj is returned. The former case trades off assurance for low cost in that the result is based on previous records and does not take into account most recent revocation. By contrast, in the latter case, the result is directly based on the certificate issuer's latest decision but incurs more communication and computing costs. Another way to enhance assurance is to let each CA also notify all CAS in its I table when a CA revokes a certificate and each CA receiving the revocation simply saves it to its local CRL and continue forwarding the message in the same way. As a result, each CA has the CRL of all other CAS it trusts and can answer the verification request on behalf of them.
On the other hand, if y comes into a new community and wants to authenticates node 2, it may choose to either phone home or trust the new local CA and rely on it to provide certificate services. The former option stops working when y loses network connectivity to its original community, which takes place more often than not in MANET. The latter solution does not have this problem but requires new trust to be established, which entirely relies on y's own judgment.
A more tricky issue is when y is a CA server of its original community. Since the CA uses threshold signature, losing one server does not prevent a CA from functioning. However, if more than N -K servers leave the community, the CA is broken. We have not addressed this problem in the current approach. To tackle this problem, we plan to require each CA server to find an inheritor before leaving and securely transfer the partial secret it keeps to the inheritor. Then the inheritor notifies other CA servers and generates a new CA certificate describing the new composition.
Trust chain is only used for key authentication in this paper due to our narrow definition of trust. But its use is not limited to that. By adding more semantics to the trust definition, trust chain makes it possible to establish distributed trust. For instance, when trust is based on nodes' behavior, the CAS actually become monitors and any node can verify if another node is decent if there is a trust chain between their monitors.
Protocols
It is straightforward to implement the trust chain protocol defined in Sect 3 when each vertex is a single network node. However, in our trust chain a vertex represents a local CA, which actually consists of a group of CA servers. Communication protocols are needed to ensure that a group of servers can behave like a single server. Typical solution to this problem in fixed wired networks is picking up a server as a master and let it represent the team. However this will not work in our system because no one can be trusted absolutely. Furthermore the improvement of security in CA lies in its threshold fashion such that no single (or in more general less than quorum) server can compromise the whole system. This only makes sense if each server makes the decision of trusting or distrusting other CA's on its own but mater-slave kindof solution invalidates the assumption. To solve this problem, we define two protocols: CA Table Update protocol (CTU) and CA Head Election protocol (CHE), both of which work in an autonomous fashion. That is, each of the servers keeps a copy of all the data including R, and I tables and makes trust decisions independently based on its local data signed with its partial key, while combining these decisions together leads to a uniform decision bearing the CA signature.
In the rest of the section, we will explain in details how the two protocols work. Assume we have a CA C; = {GI, C, , , ... C;N} with N servers ,K as the threshold, and the local copies of R;, and I; of each CA server C,k(l 5 k 5 N ) are denoted as &, and I;k, respectively. Especially, A server C;k will not update its local copy of R ; k un- In both cases, the message signed with the C A key also serves as aconfirmation: aserver willnotgeneratemorepartial signature if it is still waiting for another confirmation.
Since in MANET there is no guarantee of message delivery, the server will time out if no confirmation is received.
The protocol works even if there are faulty or compromised servers as long as they are less than N -K. To get a valid signature, a proxy server, no matter it is honest or dishonest, needs to collect K correctly partially signed and unanimous R. Since we assume at least there are K honest servers which cache the correct R 
CA Head Election Protocol
When dealing with multiple update requests at the same time, the CA Table Update ( In general the two different UPDATES result in different RI but if all servers only sign one table a time, the two different tables will be signed in sequence and thus with different version number. However, compromised servers can simply sign both requests such that both Ci,, and Ci,, now may have enough partial signatures to construct their RI with the same version number. This will cause confusion to other CA's when they need to update their trust table since version number is used to make sure only the latest table from the trusted CA's will be considered. To solve the problem we have to restrict that only one request is allowed to be sent at a time. To simplify the protocol, we require in one C A only one server, called Head, is permitted to send request. To avoid trusting any single server naively, the server is elected by the group and rotated periodically andor on demand. There is no means of preventing a Head from vio-lating the protocol. However, this can he easily detected by honest servers which receive multiple requests at the same time. The protocol is simple and works as follows: N -11, ( H e a d I D + 1)modN works. When some server Ci, calls an election, it multicasts the request to all other servers. 3. Similar to table update, C,, generates the fully signed notice for the new head, multicasts it to all others and they will update their head accordingly.
When a server
There is no need to restrict a CA to only generate one partial signature for the new head at a time in this protocol, because even if multiplerequests anive at the same time, a CA server will only signs the one which matches its only calculation, which remains the same since GetNextHead always returns the same value when current HeadID i s unchanged.
Message Delivery Fault Tolerance
Messages can get lost at network layer, i.e. routing failure and application layer, i.e. a C A server dropping requests. The former problem has been extensively studied i n MANET routing algorithms [17, 161 and is beyond the scope of this paper. We simply assume for each message sent at least K honest servers in a CA will receive it. We would like to tackle the latter case. As we know, a single compromised server can not forge a valid signature and the only harm it may do is Denial-of-Service(DoS) attack by dropping it silently. However, this is detectable if it takes place inside a CA where for each request a reply is expected by the requester and dropping a request will finally result in discovery of the deviation from the protocol. The only threat is to inter-CA messages including ESTABLISH and UPDATE. In this case, both sender and receiver can be compromised.
There are two options for this. First, since lost of messages only results in other CA's having out-of-date trust relations. we let each CA run a mandatory periodic update notifications to everyone in its I table by picking up both sender and the receiver randomly. In this solution, the risk is bounded and finally an update notification can be received by an honest server in other CA's. Second, since out of N -K + 1 servers there is at least one honest server, we can guarantee success of message delivery if there are at least N -K+ 1 senders and receivers. To do this, each CA picks up N -K + 1 servers as senders and every time when a CA sends message to another, let each server in the sender CA to determine if it is one of the N -K + 1. If it is, it sends the message to the receiver CA by picking up randomly N -K + 1 servers of the CA. To make it more efficient, each server is assigned a priority and delay a different time before sending the message using a delay timer. If the server receives a confirmation before the timer expires, it simply cancels the timer. For instance, when sending ES-TABLISH message to another CA, a server set up the timer and when it receives UPDATE message from the CA, it cancels the timer. We take both approaches in our solution without implementing the timer.
Evaluation
We evaluate our locality driven key management architecture in a hybrid method of both prototype implementation and simulation. First we implement a prototype based on openssl [3] libcrypto library on Linux platform in C to evaluate the real computation cost of the threshold scheme. Second, we use NS-2 141 to simulate the protocols to evaluate its effectiveness and communication overhead. The limitations and potential optimizations of our implementation are also discussed.
Prototype Implementation
The prototype implements the basic signature generation function of CA's. It consists of 3000 lines of C code and is compiled on Linux 2. Table 1 and 2. The calculation is based on RSA 1024 hit publiclprivate key.
From table 1 and 2, the overall cost is higher on the low-end PDAs than on more powerful and resourceful fullfledged computers. The computation cost from the CA server's perspective is independent of how the CA is composed because the computation load remains the same. Furthermore, the impact of increasing K on the proxy is nearly indiscernible. As observed by J. Kong et al. in [13] when compared to that of key generation, can be ignored. However, the total delay becomes bigger with the number of servers in the CA and the threshold increasing. This is actually due to the increased network communication costs and the waiting time to collect all p&ial signatures.
Simulation
The simulation targets for non-computational perspectives of our architecture including communication cost and effectiveness in different scenarios of MANET. It leverages NS-2 simulator and mainly consists of 1500 lines of C t t code and a few hundred lines of TCL code.
Measurements
We evaluates the localization driven key management architecture from effectiveness and communication cost aspects.
A certificate service is effective if it can react to changes of bust in the system in time. In our inter-CA trust chain, a change of trust will he propagated along each trust chain and CA's on the chain will update their trust tables according to the new change. We define the vulnerable window of a CA as the time between an event of trust change happens and the CA finishes updating its R table for the event, denoted by V. In a vulnerable window, a CA makes decision on trusting or distrusting other CA's based on its previous records, rather than the most recent events. The smaller V the more effective the system is. It is especially significant for a CA to deal with certificate revocation because small V ensures low false positive rate resulting from granting trust to CA's which should have been distrusted if it had received the most recent events. Another important perspective of the system performance is communication cost. The threshold cryptography enhances the security at the cost of messages since generation of a signature gets at least the threshold K number of nodes involved. This is even aggravated by the fact that no single node can be absolutely trusted and thus to ensure correct message delivery redundancy is brought in. We calculate the communication cost by the number of messages triggered by a single event. However, this number varies based on different logic topology of the trust relationships. To avoid being further complicated by these runtime variants; we only calculate the message cost when there is a single trust chain, denoted by A 4 because that of multiple chains is upper-bounded by (number of the chains) x M . 
Scenarios, Parameters and Results
We modify Camegie Mellon University setdesr [9] utility to generate random-way point mobility models with different node moving speed. The speed varies from 5, 10, 15, 20, 2 5 d s etc. The simulations are run with 150-300 nodes spread in areas ranging from 300x300,500x500 and 800x800m2. The results are shown in Figure 3 ,4, 5, 7 and 6. In the current simulation implementation, we simply use multiplc unicasts to simulate a multicast. Therefore, from the aspect of underlying communication cost, the simulation results can be considered as the upper bound. As shown in Figure 3 ber of nodes per 10000 square meters(m2), decreases in that sparser the network, farther two nodes are from each other and therefore more difficultly routes can be found.
Unlike the vulnerable window size V , message'cost is in direct proportion to the number of servers(N) and threshold K of CA as expected as shown in Figure 6 . Figure 7 shows that either network density or volalility does not impact the message cost significantly. This is because we do not rely on retransimission to fail over routing problem or network partition due to the high cost. Instead, we intend to use routine and event based updates to repair broken chains, in which if an update notification fails to reach other CA's, it is simply dropped and the system waits for either next routine or event-triggered update.
Limitations
The main weakness of our architecture is the commonly trusted dealer in each community. Schemes discussed in [14] allows partial shares of secret to he distributed to each CA servers withoutrequiring the help of a commonly trusted dealer. We have not implemented them in our current prototype to conduct more experiments. In addition, the cost incurred by control messages of our architecture is evaluated in terms of the number of messages. To better understand the network overhead of the protocol, routing cost needs to be taken into account.
Certain optimizations can also be incorporated into the current implementation. The most important one is to implement the delay timer as mentioned in Section 4. Besides, one can use real multicast to send ESTABLISH and W-DATE messages instead of using multiple unicasts. With these optimizations in place, the overhead of our architecture can be further reduced.
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Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, we present a locality driven key management architecture for M M T . The design is motivated by our application oriented view of MANET and targeted for high fault tolerance, in-time services and efficiency. We implement a prototype and run simulations for different scenarios and the results support our design goals.
Our next step'is to apply the architecture to a real application, such as high way traffic view. Moreover, we are also investigating more sophisticated trust propagation protocols which can be plugged in to our architecture.
